

# Harmony and Coexistence in Islamic Philosophy

—The Emanation Theory in al-Fārābī’s *The Excellent City*—

Tatsuya Yamazaki

## Introduction

TODAY, I will be presenting on al-Fārābī’s *The Excellent City* (also translated *On the Perfect State*<sup>1</sup>). Through studying this content, I would like to consider Islamic philosophy’s approach to the principles of harmony and coexistence. The outline of my talk is as follows:

1. Short history of al-Fārābī and his works
2. The structure and organization of *The Excellent City*
3. Allāh as the First Cause
4. Emanative Cosmology
5. Human beings as a rational existent
  - 5.1 The faculty of reason and the Active Intellect
  - 5.2 The characteristics and revelation of the ruler of *The Excellent City*
6. True felicity
7. Conclusion

## 1. Short History of al-Fārābī and His Works

Abū Naṣr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Tarkhān b. Awasalugh al-Fārābī was born around 870 in Wasij of the Fārāb region in Central Asia (currently the Republic of Kazakhstan). It is nearly certain that his father was of Turkish descent, but no works of his in Turkish have been discovered. It is most probable that he stayed in Baghdad since a very young age, and learned Aristotelian logic from Nestorian Christians. From there, he moved to Constantinople, then on to Damascus, then lived a short time in Egypt, then returned to Damascus, and passed away at the age of 80-years-old.

He was a prolific writer with his works spanning many different topics. Some of his most significant works are as follows:

1. *Sharḥ al-Fārābī li-Kitāb Aristūṭālīs fī al-‘Ibāra* (*Commentary and Short*

*Treatise on Aristotle's "De interpretation"*)

2. *Talkhīs Nawāmīs Aflātūn* (Summary of Plato's "Laws")
3. *Kiābu al-Jam' bayn al-Ḥakīmayn Aflātūn Ilāhī wa Aristūṭālīs* (Book on the Agreement of the Opinions of the Two Sages, the Divine Plato and Aristotle)
4. *Ihṣā' al-'Ulūm* (Enumeration of the Sciences)
5. *Taḥṣīl al-Sa 'āda* (The Attainment of Happiness)
6. *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf* (Book of Letters)
7. *Risāla fī al-'Aql* (The Letter Concerning the Intellect)

He has also written on themes such as psychology and music. From the above, it can be surmised that al-Fārābī follows the lineage of Aristotle in Greece and in the realm of Islamic philosophy, Aristotle is regarded as the first teacher (*al-muḥarrrik al-awwal*) and al-Fārābī was called the second teacher (*al-mu'allim al-thānī*).

## 2. The Structure and Organization of *The Excellent City*

*The Excellent City*, which has been translated into many different languages and studied by numerous scholars, is one of al-Fārābī's most representative works. According to one recent study, al-Fārābī is said to have begun writing this work in Baghdad in 942 (year 330 in the Islamic calendar), and completed it in Damascus the following year in 943<sup>2</sup>. At first glance, considering only the title, one would think that this work is in reference to only a political theme, however, upon closer examination, the work reveals insights into the natural environment, uranology (astronomy), the theory of creation and annihilation, physiology, as well as thoughts about the soul. All of these insights are united by a metaphysical framework which places Allāh as the First Cause of all existing things. In this respect, as R. Walzer (1901–1975: translator/commentator of this work) points out, this work can be regarded as al-Fārābī's *Summa Philosophiae*<sup>3</sup>, or a comprehensive treatise of his philosophy.

In the beginning of the fifteenth chapter, al-Fārābī explains that humans are endowed with an inborn nature (*fiṭra ṭabī'ya*), given by Allāh. However, this inborn nature cannot be nurtured into full maturity without assistance, and the cooperation of many people in a large group, i.e. human society, is necessary to complete the task<sup>4</sup>.

That is the reason why al-Fārābī takes up the topic of an ideal city (*madīna*) and explains why this city is excellent. "The city, then, in which people aim through association at co-operating for the things by

which felicity in its real and true sense can be attained, is the excellent city.” According to al-Fārābī, an Excellent City is analogous to a healthy and complete human body. In other words, just as in a healthy body, all of the organs work together to make life more complete, and they work together to maintain a healthy stasis. All the organs of the body have a unique function and follow a “chain of command” with the heart (*qalb*) ruling over the brain (*dimāgh*), and the brain ruling the liver (*kabid*), and so on for all the organs throughout the body.

The fact that this “ranking” system follows a certain law of causality is a defining characteristic of this philosophy. If we again take the analogy of the body, the heart is the cause for all other organs to exist, and also provides the cause for them to obtain their various functions. Similarly, in an Excellent City, the ruler serves as the cause for the city to live and serves as the cause for the different parts of the city to function in line with his intent. This begs the question of where the ruler obtains his cause for becoming the ruler. Rephrased in a different way, it is a question of the ruler’s qualifications, and a question of the basis of how one gains the qualifications necessary to become a ruler.

The answer to this question lies in the metaphysical realm of al-Fārābī’s thinking. The characteristic that the entire metaphysical framework is composed of this relationship of causes in a ranking system gives this system of thought its originality. Furthermore, this framework naturally sets up the logic for the existence of an ultimate cause, which has no other causes before it, and is the reason for being of all other things which exist—a Necessary Existent (*al-wājib al-wujūd*). This is the First Cause (*al-sabab al-awwal*), or Allāh. In the next section, the features of the First Cause will be considered.

### 3. Allāh as the First Cause

Allāh as the First Cause, is referred to as the First (*al-awwal*), the First Existent (*al-wujūd al-awwal*), the First Substance (*al-jawhar al-awwal*), and simply the One (*wāḥid*). Al-Fārābī states the following as features:

1. The First Cause is not lacking in any way
2. Its existence is in the most superior form, and pre-exists all others
3. Therefore, this existence can never be destroyed or made void
4. Allāh has no potentiality, meaning Allāh is only Allāh.
5. Therefore, this existence has no beginning (*azali*), and its essence (*dhat*) is the eternal being (*dā'im al-wujūd*)
6. It does not hold material cause (*causa materialis*), formal cause (*causa*

*formalis*), moving cause (*causa efficiens*), nor final cause (*causa finalis*)

Allāh as the First Cause can be said to be an autonomous, absolute and an inevitable existence upon itself. However, when viewed as the ultimate existence in the framework of causality, Allāh becomes the source from which all things originate in a ranked order, and within the system of relationships, takes on meaning relative to those other existences.

#### 4. Emanative Cosmology

An Emanative Cosmology, based on the Aristotelian view, is derived within a metaphysical framework and is used as an analogy to explain the hierarchy. From the First, emanates the Second, and the Second is called the First Intellect<sup>6</sup>, and becomes the highest creature (created by the First). When the First Intellect thinks about the First, the Second Intellect emanates, and comes into being. Then, when the Second Intellect thinks about himself, the First Heaven comes into being. As the chain of causation continues, when the Second Intellect thinks about the First, the Third Intellect is emanated. Then, when the Third Intellect thinks about himself, the Fixed Star comes into being. The process continues. The Fourth Intellect emanates the Fifth Intellect and Saturn, the Fifth Intellect emanates the Sixth Intellect and Jupiter, the Sixth Intellect emanates the Seventh Intellect and Mars, the Seventh Intellect emanates the Eighth Intellect and the Sun, the Eighth Intellect emanates the Ninth Intellect and Venus, the Ninth Intellect emanates the Tenth Intellect and the Moon Sphere comes into being. The Tenth Intellect is called the Active Intellect (*'aql fa'āl*). From the First to the Tenth, the Separate Intellects are eternally emanating, and the creation of the Nine Heavens completes the Cosmology.

The realm below the Moon Sphere (sublunary) is the phenomenal world which human beings experience. In the sublunary are the four elements of fire, air, water and earth along with water vapor, flames and rocks as well as metals, plants, non-rational animals and rational beings, i.e. humans. In contrast to the first ten intellects, which only exist in thought, all of the existences in the sublunary realm are material (*mādda wa hayūlā*) and have form (*sūra wa hay'a*).

#### 5. Human Beings as a Rational Existent

When bringing human beings come into existence, the first faculty that

comes into being is the nutritive faculty (*al-quwwa al-ġādiyya*). Then, the perceptual faculty (*al-quwwa al-ḥāssa*) comes into being. With this perceptual faculty, humans can detect hot and cold, perceive tastes, smells, sounds, colors and light, anything visible or concrete. Then, the faculty of desire (*al-quwwa an-nuzū'yya*) arises after perceiving, and as a result, aspires for or abhors those desires. After that, the impression that is left in the heart/mind after the object itself is no longer present is called the faculty of representation (*al-quwwa al-mutaḥayyila*), which can store memory. Then, in turn, the faculty of reason (*al-quwwa an-nāṭqa*) arises. Due to these faculties, humans are able to think about the intelligibles, and make determinations of beauty and ugliness, good and bad, eventually allowing us to establish the arts and sciences.

### 5.1 The Faculty of Reason and the Active Intellect

The faculty of reason originally instilled within human beings cannot function in actuality without assistance. The intellect functions only after the objects of reasoning are impressed upon the faculty of reason. The objects of reasoning are both the actual intellect, as well as the actually intelligible, and these are both considered immaterial phenomena. Al-Fārābī regarded human intelligence before it functions in actuality as “a disposition in matter prepared to receive the imprints of the intelligibles”. This “disposition in matter” is the intellect in potential (*aql bi-al-qūwah*)<sup>7</sup>, i.e. the material intellect (*aql al-hayūlānī*), while at the same time, it is the potentially intelligible. In other words, matter itself, or anything that consists of matter, whether it be in the state of actuality or in the state of potentiality, cannot be regarded as intellect.

Moreover, this potential intellect instilled within human beings cannot be converted by oneself into actual wisdom, or wisdom that works in actuality. For potentiality to become actuality, the presence of the other is required. Only when an object of reasoning appears within a human being's faculty of reason does human intelligence become intellect in actuality. Al-Fārābī regarded “that” as “a thing having some sort of actuality as intellect, and is detached from all matter, and serves as the essence (*dhātun mā*).” In other words, since “that” exists in a realm of non-matter, it is the transcendental existent, and additionally, in relation to one's true self, “that” exists as intellect in actuality. This intellect is what al-Fārābī calls “the Active Intellect” (*aql fa'āl*).

The term “Active Intellect” is originally derived from the phrase, “the intellect which makes all things (*νοῦς τῶ πάντα ποιεῖν*)” which is taken from Aristotle's *On the Soul (De anima)*, volume three, chapter

five. This phrase from Aristotle's work is developed into the concept of "The Active Intellect (*νοῦς ποιητικός*, *intellectus agens*, 'aql fa' 'āl)," and the significance of this "intellect in actuality ('aql bi-alfi'l)" is that it contains no potentiality whatsoever, and exists as a constantly working intellect.

However, the original Aristotelian presentation of the phrase is unclear, inviting various possible interpretations. In the phrase, "this intellect is separable, impassive and unmixed, since it is essentially an activity,"<sup>8</sup> it is not clear whether the word separable (*χωριστός*) is referring to those things outside of the soul or not. Interpretations diverge among scholars of early Aristotelian thinking. Alexander of Aphrodisias (ca. 198 to 209) whose works influenced Islamic philosophy, promotes the view that the Active Intellect is a god-like entity which is separate from the soul, whereas Themistios (ca. 317 to 388) interprets the Active Intellect as a function within the human soul.

Although al-Fārābī considers the Active Intellect to be a separable entity, he does not believe it to be divine as Alexander does. As mentioned earlier, al-Fārābī regarded the Active Intellect to be the Tenth Intellect, and that it is in a position to serve as an intermediary step between Allāh and human beings, because of its status as the lowest intellect (and therefore, closest to humans). Another Muslim scholar who interpreted the Active Intellect to be in such a position was Ibn Sīnā (980 to 1038, a.k.a. Avicenna). This point is a common defining feature of Islamic philosophy.

Aristotle uses "light" (*φῶς*) as an analogy of the Active Intellect<sup>9</sup>, and explains how the presence or absence of light functions to change color from a potential form to an actual form. However, Aristotle's explanation is rather vague and lacks specificity. Using a metaphor of the sun and the sense of sight, al-Fārābī explains the relationship between intellect that is in potentiality and the Active Intellect. In his example, a red rose is placed within sight. If the sun has set, and it is night, our sense of sight is not activated as it is dark, and although the red rose exists, we cannot perceive it. When the sun rises, however, and the world is bathed in the sun's light, and our sense of sight is activated—changing from potential to actual ability. The red color of the rose becomes vibrantly visible—the object of perception.

In the same way, due to the functioning of the Tenth Intellect (separable intellect), the potential intellect (material intellect), is transformed into actual intellect, and the object of reasoning (intelligibles) also changes from a potential state to an actual state<sup>10</sup>. Emphasizing this point about the relationship between the separable intellect and the

material intellect, as in the metaphor of the sun and the sense of sight, al-Fārābī provides the basis for identifying the separable intellect as the Active Intellect, and the material intellect as the Passive Intellect (*'aql munfa'īl*)<sup>11</sup>.

## 5.2 The Characteristics and Revelation of the Ruler of

### *The Excellent City*

According to al-Fārābī, the ruler of the Excellent City is one who is not ruled by any other human being. It is a person who has achieved completeness—one who has made intellect and the objects of reasoning into actuality. Put in another way, it can be said that this person has completely perceived all objects of reasoning by the Passive Intellect, and as a result, both their intellect and objects of reasoning are in actuality. This also means that the objects of reasoning and the subjects of reason are one within this person.

Within this person, an actual intellect is conceived. This intellect transcends the realm of the Passive Intellect, as it is more complete than a Passive Intellect, because it is separable from the material. Al-Fārābī names this the Acquired Intellect (*'aql al-mustafād, intellectus acquisitus*), and this intellect is positioned as an intermediary step between the Passive Intellect and Active Intellect. Intermediary in this case signifies that the Passive Intellect serves as the material and substratum of the Acquired Intellect, and that the Acquired Intellect serves as the material and substratum of the Active Intellect.

However, as it has been mentioned previously, all people are originally endowed with “a disposition in matter prepared to receive the imprints of the intelligibles”. This indicates an ability for the intellect to become actual, but in order to reach the state of Active Intellect, it is required that two stages be cleared—the first stage is to manifest the Passive Intellect, and the second stage is to manifest the Acquired Intellect. The ruler of the Excellent City manifests the Acquired Intellect as material for the Active Intellect, and further, when the two intellects become one, it is said that he is “the man on whom the Active Intellect has descended”.

For the Active Intellect to descend, a sequence of emanation is followed. First, Allāh emanates to the Active Intellect, then emanates through the intermediary Acquired Intellect to the Passive Intellect, then emanates further to the faculty of representation (symbolism). This is what al-Fārābī regards as revelation (*wahy*). Emanation from the Active Intellect to the Acquired Intellect allows a person to become a philosopher, in other words, a total man of wisdom (*muta'qqil*), and

the emanation from the Active Intellect to the faculty of representation allows a person to become a prophet (*nabiyy*).

The soul of the philosopher is in a state of *ka-l-muttaḥida*<sup>12</sup>, or oneness with the Active Intellect, making him none other than an *Imām*. According to al-Fārābī, an *Imām* is a person who is a ruler that has no ruler above him, and not only is he the foremost ruler of the Excellent City, he is also the ruler of the Excellent Community (*umma*), as well as the leader of the entire realm of humanity as a whole. It is worthy to note here that the definition of an *Imām* is a philosopher<sup>13</sup>—which excludes a religious connotation. The concept of an *Imām* generally includes the notion of a “leader”, but al-Fārābī points out that “leader” here does not simply indicate the person who leads a group in prayer. He also mentions that a condition to be the ruler of the Excellent City includes being endowed by inborn nature to have inherent qualities of a ruler, but also specifies that being a ruler does not necessitate having roots in the Quraysh clan, to which Muhammad belonged.

Also according to al-Fārābī, revelation is a metaphysical cognition, and is not a mystical or irrational cognition. Through revelation, a philosopher can directly cognate intellectually, the truth that is imparted by Allāh. On the other hand, a prophet is only able to indirectly cognate the truth by Allāh through symbols. This indicates that al-Fārābī regarded philosophy to be superior to religion, at least in the area of cognition theory. This coincides with the previously mentioned ranking structure of the faculties, where the faculty of reason rules over the faculty of representation (symbolism).

Perhaps, a more important discussion may be what is the content of Allāh’s intellect that emanates from the Active Intellect to human intellect? As it is clear from al-Fārābī’s definition of the first condition of a ruler as one who knows a multitude of approaches for realizing happiness, the content of Allāh’s intellect is happiness (*sa’āda*). This leads to the last section, which examines the definition of happiness.

## 6. True Felicity

Plato states, “we have no more need to ask for what end a man wishes to be happy, when such is his wish: the answer seems to be ultimate.”<sup>14</sup> As this indicates, happiness is one of life’s ultimate goals. Al-Fārābī proposed that a philosopher which was at one with the Active Intellect, is perfect at any level of humanness, and is at the supreme state of happiness<sup>15</sup>. The reason man is equipped with the faculty of rational thought is to know true felicity. In addition, as already stated, the reason



humans create cities is so that true felicity can be obtained. It then follows that fundamentally, all human activity should be directed toward achieving true felicity.

Learning from the theory of happiness put forth by Aristotle in *Ethica Nicomachea*, al-Fārābī states, “these being goods not only for their own sake but goods for the sake of felicity only.”<sup>16</sup> In other words, felicity is not the requirement for acquiring other things. Wealth, health and honor are goods to acquire felicity, and felicity is not a good to acquire those things. Therefore, felicity is the good of all good, and Aristotle called felicity the highest good (τὸ ἄριστον).

Al-Fārābī goes on to say that intentions to achieve felicity are actions of good and derive from virtue (*faḍīla*). Virtue is a good for felicity, but is not a good unto itself. It was Aristotle who observed the relationship between human actions and felicity, and he believed that the experiences and customs of the phenomenal world were important stating, “activities of the soul derive from virtue (ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ’ ἀρετῆν).”<sup>17</sup> Following in this tradition, al-Fārābī emphasizes the importance of customs and devotion behind human actions.<sup>18</sup>

To continue making beautiful actions for good, perfect felicity can be obtained, and the soul can be released from the tethers of matter (physical presence), and become immortal<sup>19</sup>. When the soul is separated from matter, in other words, when the soul leaves the body, death takes place. Death means there is a separation of the soul from the body to which it happened to be connected. However, if the soul can separate from matter, there is no longer a need for the body. Then, one can become complete, and live as a philosopher. Al-Fārābī’s concept of felicity both encompasses the living world as well as the afterlife.

Plato’s *Phaedo* is apparent in al-Fārābī’s view of the soul. In Plato’s work, a dying Socrates explains that the body is a prison (εἰργμός) for the soul, and to detach the soul from the physical form and get it accustomed to that state is a process of purification (κάθαρσις). Then, finally, he speaks of philosophy being a practice (μελετάειν) for death. Although al-Fārābī uses Aristotle as a model for living and places high importance on experiences, he ultimately adopts a more Platonic outlook. Aristotle’s theory of felicity is mainly relevant in the phenomenal world, but when the concept of felicity expands into the realm of the afterlife, Islamic philosophy finds this approach insufficient.

To al-Fārābī, the knowledge of the afterlife is not merely an exercise in thought. This knowledge is incorporated in the framework of the Emanative Cosmology of Allāh and has a position within the realm of

human beings. This awareness frees us from the negative aspects of anthropocentric thinking. This leads us toward a morality of living correctly as human beings, and that way of life leads us toward felicity. Putting his entire being into solving this complex dilemma, al-Fārābī found an approach that links the afterlife in a way that transcends our phenomenal world in a realistic and meaningful way.

## 7. Conclusion

Izutsu Toshihiko (1914–1993) comments on *The Excellent City* stating, “in accordance with the strict requirements of philosophy, this program is extremely ambitious as it seeks to reconstruct human society from a fundamental level affecting everything from the individual’s life to societal life to policies governing society to laws that govern the state.”<sup>20</sup> Therefore, it is easy to imagine that contemporaries such as al-Ash’arī, 873 to 935, would insist on a more traditional approach in contrast to al-Fārābī’s heavy reliance on Mu’talaza rationalistic theology (*kalām*). The fact that al-Fārābī challenged the status quo makes him worthy of being called a great scholar.

One of the great debates of the era was one surrounding the role of the will of Allāh versus the self-determination of man. In the Qur’an, all human intents are determined by the will of Allāh as represented by the following passage, “Nothing will befall us except what Allāh has ordained for us. (Chapter 9 Verse 51)” In contrast, the Mu’talaza rejected the premise of Allāh’s will and proposed that humans can self-determine their own fate, but this rejection would not go unnoticed by the traditionalists. Al-Ash’arī’s theological philosophy was a voice from within the Mu’talaza to support the traditionalists.

It was perhaps because of this background that al-Fārābī reconstructed Islamic theology from a philosophical viewpoint. Through this process of reconstruction, he was able to come to an understanding of the order of the universe based on harmony—a harmony which included the coexistence of all humankind and human society.

Furthermore, this reconstruction borrowed from and merged with the framework already created by Plato, Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. Within the history of European theology, this reconstruction was a seemingly impossible task, however, the fact that al-Fārābī was able to do so in a manner that melded together so smoothly is an accomplishment that indicates the sophistication of Islamic philosophy. To have Allāh as both the source of all things and the pinnacle of all existence from which all things emanate, al-Fārābī created a context for

the order of the entire universe. This is the essential feature of his metaphysical philosophy.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Walzer, R., *Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State*, 1998 Reprinted by arrangement with Oxford Publishing Limited, Oxford University Press 1985.

<sup>2</sup> Rudolph, U., Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, in: *Philosophie in der islamischen Welt Bd. 1, 8.–10 Jahrhundert*, Herausgegeben von Ulrich Rudolph unter Mitarbeit von Renate Würsch, Basel, 2012, S. 397.

<sup>3</sup> Walzer, R., *Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State*, 1998 Reprinted by arrangement with Oxford Publishing Limited, Oxford University Press 1985, Introduction, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> The thought that the human being needs society by nature reminds us of a passage in the *Politics* of Aristotle: “man is by nature a political animal” (1253a2-3: ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον).

<sup>5</sup> Walzer, p. 231.

<sup>6</sup> This Intellect corresponds to the *Nous* of Plotinos, and means the Aristotelian God namely »a thinking of thinking« (ἡ νόησις νοήσεως) in the twelve book of *Metaphysics*.

<sup>7</sup> This concept comes originally from a concept: “the intellect which becomes all things (νοῦς πάντα γίνεσθαι, *De anima* lib. 3 cap. 5, 430b15) in the Aristotelian philosophy. This intellect is called “the possible intellect” (νοῦς δυνάμει: intellectus possibilis: ‘aql munfa’il).

<sup>8</sup> Aristoteles, *De anima*, lib. 3 cap. 5, 430a17–18: οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμικτός, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνεργεῖα.

<sup>9</sup> Aristoteles, *De anima*, lib. 3 cap. 5, 430a16–17: ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς τρόπον γὰρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργεῖα χρώματα.

<sup>10</sup> Al-Fārābī calls intelligibles which arise at first in the rational faculty »al-ma’qūlāt al-ūlā« (the common first intelligibles), which were translated from τὰ πρῶτα νόητα which means the startpoint of logic thinking namely principal of every science in Peripatetic school. Al-Fārābī gives example so: “the whole is greater than the part”, “the same thing are all equal to one another.”

<sup>11</sup> Walzer, R., *Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State*, 1998 Reprinted by arrangement with Oxford Publishing Limited, Oxford University Press 1985, Commentary, p. 403.

<sup>12</sup> This state does not mean so-called unio mystica. It is impossible to unite with God, so far as we are not free from material in this life.

<sup>13</sup> Walzer identifies the *Imām* with the Platonic philosopher-king. Walzer, R., *Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State*, 1998 Reprinted by arrangement with Oxford Publishing Limited, Oxford University Press 1985, Commentary, p. 441.

<sup>14</sup> Platon, *Symposium*, 205A: καὶ οὐκέτι προσδεῖ ἐρῆσθαι ἵνα τί δὲ βούλεται εὐδαιμόνων εἶναι ὁ βουλούμενος, ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν ἢ ἀπικρῖσις.

<sup>15</sup> Walzer, p. 245.

<sup>16</sup> Walzer, p. 207.

<sup>17</sup> Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea*, lib. 1 cap.7, 1098a16–17.

<sup>18</sup> Walzer, p. 261–263.

<sup>19</sup> Walzer, p. 263.

<sup>20</sup> Izutsu, T., *The Islamic Philosophy (Isramu-Tetsugaku)* in: *Izutsu Toshihiko Zenshu*, vol. 4, Keio-University, 2014, p. 401–402.

### Author Biography

**Tatsuya Yamazaki** is a Research Fellow of the Institute of Oriental Philosophy. Ph.D. His fields of research are Medieval Philosophy and Theology. He is a member of Meister-Eckhart-Gesellschaft, Japanese Society for Neoplatonic Studies, Society for Nishida-Philosophy. He is the author of *Tetsugaku to Shingaku no Harmonia: Ekkuharuto-shingaku ga mezashita mono* [Harmonia of Theology and Philosophy—What Eckhart Theology is Aiming for] (2013), “Die Analogie als ethisches Prinzip in der Theologie des Meister Eckhart,” *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* Bd. 44 Heft 3, Freiburg in der Schweiz (1997), “The Eastern Orthodox Theology and Buddhism—Deification and Nirvāṇa,” *The Journal of Oriental Studies* vol. 17, Tokyo (2007) , “Leben ohne Warum—Der Ursprung des Lebens in der Theologie Meister Eckharts,” *The Journal of Oriental Studies* vol. 18, Tokyo (2008), “Die transzendente Struktur des göttlichen Seins und die Seligkeit bei Meister Eckhart,” *Wahrheit auf dem Weg: Festschrift für Ludwig Hödl zu seinem fünfundachtzigsten Geburtstag, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters NF. Bd. 72*, Münster (2009).